number of jobs, so that if more of those jobs are taken by the nonretiring elderly, there will be fewer such jobs for the young. This view is commonly disputed by economists, however, who argue that the labor market is not a fi xed box but is rather a dynamic market that can adapt to large changes in labor supply. In the U.S. context, this view appears to dominate, as there has been little discussion of the "crowding out" of the young by older workers.
In this paper, we investigate the extent of such "crowding out" in the United States over time. We begin by documenting time series trends in labor supply by age group. We then turn to a more formal regression analysis of those trends. Finally, we develop a measure of the variation over time in the incentives for retirement of the elderly and relate that to the labor supply of both the elderly and younger workers. Overall, our data suggest little substitution across these groups.
Background

Institutional Features of Social Security
As this paper focuses on labor supply responses to Social Security reform, a brief overview of the Social Security program is necessary to understand how the program affects retirement; see Diamond and Gruber (1998) for a more detailed review. An individual is entitled to retired worker benefi ts once he or she has worked forty quarters in covered employment. Benefi ts are calculated in several steps. Annual earnings are indexed by an average wage index, and the thirty-fi ve highest years of earnings are used to compute the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).
1 A progressive formula is applied to the AIME to obtain the primary insurance amount (PIA). Finally, the PIA is adjusted to obtain the monthly benefi t amount based on when benefi ts are fi rst received. Individuals claiming at the normal retirement age (NRA, legislated to grow slowly from sixty-fi ve to sixty-seven) receive the PIA. Individuals can receive benefi ts as early as age sixty-two (the early retirement age, or ERA) or can delay until age seventy. Benefi ts are reduced by 6.67 percent for each year of receipt prior to the NRA and are increased by a delayed retirement credit of 3 percent to 8 percent for each year receipt is postponed past the NRA, depending on the worker's birth year.
2 Benefi t receipt is subject to an earnings test before age sixty-fi ve, whereby earnings above a fl oor amount reduce benefi ts currently and cause them instead to be paid out (with an actuarial adjustment) upon full retirement. Spouses of benefi ciaries also receive a dependent benefi t equal to 50 percent of the 1. Earnings after age sixty are in nominal dollars, increasing the incentive to work at these ages.
2. The delayed retirement credit (DRC) is rising from 3 percent for workers born prior to 1925 to 8 percent for workers born after 1942. For workers with an NRA above sixty-fi ve, benefi ts are reduced 5 percent per year for receipt more than three years before the NRA. worker's PIA or a survivor benefi t equal to 100 percent of the worker's PIA although the spouse receives only the larger of this and his or her own retired worker benefi t. Benefi ts are funded with a payroll tax of 12.4 percent, paid half by employers and half by employees.
Additional work affects Social Security wealth in several ways. First, the additional year of earnings may replace an earlier year of zero or low earnings in the AIME calculation, raising the monthly benefi t. Second, work beyond age sixty-two implies a delay in claiming benefi ts (if earnings are signifi cantly above the earnings test fl oor). Benefi ts are foregone for a year, but future benefi ts are higher due to the actuarial adjustment. Finally, additional work results in additional payroll taxes. The combination of these three effects determines whether the Social Security system provides a return to additional work that is more or less than actuarially fair.
Concerns over "Crowding Out" of Labor Supply of Young
The United States has really had only two major reforms of its Social Security system over the past thirty years. The fi rst was the "Greenspan Commission" in 1983, called in to solve an impending fi scal crisis for the program. Part of the Commission's recommendations, which were adopted into law, was extending the "normal retirement age" from age sixty-fi ve to age sixty-seven over a period of many years. As Coile and Gruber (2007) estimate, such a reform has a relatively modest impact on retirement decisions because the actuarially fair U.S. system makes incentives roughly neutral around retirement ages. Perhaps as a result, there is no evidence of a signifi cant discussion about the labor market consequences of this bill for the nonelderly. A detailed literature search found only one article from this entire era addressing the issue. Hicks (1977, 33) writes "Increasing the retirement age may cost the unemployed as many as 150,000 to 200,000 jobs a year, plus delaying the promotions of those already working."
The second major reform was the removal of the "earnings test" for Social Security after age sixty-fi ve, which was legislated in 2000. Once again there was little discussion of possible substitution of the labor supply of the elderly for that of the young. Smith (2003) titled her article "Senior Citizens Are among Teenagers' Job Competition," but the article itself contains little discussion of this point. Congressman Jim Bunning, in announcing a hearing on the future of Social Security, did say about options to raise the retirement age, "But retirement income might be lower for those who cannot work longer due to employers continuing to provide incentives for older workers to retire and make room for younger workers" (Committee on Ways and Means 1998) . This is only a very modest set of comments on an issue that is a major source of discussion in other nations. Somehow, the "lump of labor" view does not appear to have taken hold in a meaningful way in the United States.
Time Series Trends
Our analysis of the labor market impacts of changing elderly labor force participation uses data from the nation's largest annual labor market survey, the Current Population Survey (CPS). We use data from the annual March supplement to the CPS, for most years from 1962 through 2007.
3 This supplement includes detailed questions about labor force participation that are fairly constant over time. We divide our sample into three age groups: those twenty to twenty-four (the "young"), those twenty-fi ve to fi fty-four ("prime age"), and those fi fty-fi ve to sixty-four (the "elderly"). We examine several variables of interest: labor force participation (LFP), employment, and unemployment. We take averages of these measures for each age group over time using the provided survey weights. The analysis is presented in each case fi rst for both sexes pooled together, then for males and females separately.
Time series comparisons of the trends across age groups are shown in panel A of fi gure 12.1. The labor force participation (LFP) of the elderly displays a gentle U-shaped pattern, dropping until the late 1980s before rising through to 2007. The LFP of the young is rising through time, likely because of increasing participation by females. Finally, the unemployment rate of the young hits its highest points in the late 1970s and early 1980s when elderly LFP is at its lowest. This does not appear consistent with the crowd-out hypothesis.
We break this analysis down by sex in panels B and C of fi gure 12.1. The LFP of young males is fairly constant at around 80 percent over the entire span. Participation by elderly men rebounds only slightly in the late 1990s and does not reach the levels seen in the 1960s. In contrast, the LFP of both young and older women increases over the time period studied here. For younger women, the increase is concentrated in the fi rst two decades of the sample up to the mid-1980s. In contrast, the LFP of the elderly women does not begin to rise until the mid-1990s, when it rises substantially. Finally, the cyclicality of male youth unemployment appears to exceed that of females.
Panel A of fi gure 12.2 displays the LFP of the elderly against the unemployment rate for the young and the prime-aged. The most noticeable pattern here is the cyclicality of the unemployment rate for the youth, which is mirrored in a muted way for the prime-aged. Panels B and C of fi gure 12.2 for males and females demonstrate again that males and younger individuals show more cyclicality. However, nowhere here is there any evidence of crowd out. When unemployment is at its highest in the early 1980s, elderly LFP is near its lowest.
Finally, panel A of fi gure 12.3 shows the employment rates of the youth 3 that male employment rates do not trend (but are cyclical) and that there is a very strong upward trend for both youth and prime-aged female employment. Nowhere, however, is there sign of any crowd-out effect.
To summarize the graphical analysis, we fi nd gentle U-shaped trends in the LFP of the elderly, but the labor market behavior of the youth and prime-aged is best described as cyclical for the males, and as following a secular upward trend for the females. The cyclicality and secular trend appear to be much stronger than any crowd-out effect.
"Direct" Crowding-Out Regressions
In this section, we formalize the graphical analysis of Section 12.2 by running time series regressions of the labor supply of the young and prime age on that of the elderly. We estimate time series regressions of the form:
For both the young and the prime age groups, we use unemployment rate and the employment rate as dependent variables (Y t ). The key independent variable in each regression is the rate of elderly employment (ELDERLYEMP t ). The additional control variables (X t ) that we use in some specifi cations include the level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the growth rate of GDP per capita.
We employ four different specifi cations, in common with the other countries in this project. Each of these four is repeated fi rst without any extra control variables and then with the extra X t control variables. For the fi rst specifi cation, we use the simple levels of elderly employment and the dependent variables. Next, we lag elderly employment by three years in order to try to avoid the impact of any contemporary shock affecting both sides of the equation. Third, we take the fi fth difference of all the variables in the equation. Finally, we log both elderly employment and the dependent variable and take the fi ve-year log difference. Table 12 .1 displays the results for men and women pooled together. Each cell reports the coefficient on elderly employment from a separate regression. Looking at unemployment rates in the fi rst column, we expect an increase in elderly employment to increase youth unemployment if there is crowd out. However, the coefficients down the column are strongly negative. The -0.402 coefficient in the fi rst row can be interpreted as follows: a 1 point increase in the elderly employment rate is predicted to decrease youth unemployment by 0.402 points. The coefficients, with one exception, are statistically signifi cant. This evidence is against the crowd-out hypothesis.
The second column has the results for youth employment. Here, we expect a negative coefficient if elderly employment crowds out youth employment.
Without controls in the top panel, three of four coefficients fail to attain statistical signifi cance, but all are negative. In the bottom panel, with controls, all four coefficients are statistically signifi cant at conventional levels, and all are negative. This suggests that more elderly employment leads to a decrease in youth employment, which is consistent with crowd out. Moreover, the coefficients are large. For example, with controls, the fi ve-year difference specifi cation yields a coefficient of -0.875, which is the predicted drop in the youth employment rate with a 1 point increase in the elderly employment rate. This is somewhat confusing because the unemployment rate and the employment rate are moving in the same direction. This is possible, though, if there is a large increase in labor force exits. However, these estimates might be tainted by the secular trend increase in female employment through this period. We will check this further in the male-only results that follow.
The third and fourth columns of the table investigate the impact of elderly employment on the labor market behavior of the prime-aged twenty-fi ve to fi fty-four-year-olds. The same pattern emerges as for the youth-negative impacts for the unemployment rate and the employment rate across all specifi cations, with most attaining statistical signifi cance. To check on the impact of the different trends experienced by males and females over this forty-fi ve-year time period, we break out the results for males only in table 12.2. The results for the unemployment rates are the same in direction as was seen in table 12.1. The magnitudes are sometimes higher and sometimes lower, and statistical signifi cance fails in some cases. However, for the males, the message is clear that the youth and the prime-aged unemployment rates drop when elderly employment increases. In contrast to the pooled sex results, the impact on youth is mixed and for prime-aged employment is strongly positive. For the youth, two positive estimates attain statistical signifi cance at the 10 percent level, and there is one signifi cant negative result. The rest are not statistically signifi cant. For the prime-aged, seven of the eight are positive and statistically signifi cant. The difference between these results and table 12.1 may be driven by the increasing female employment rates through time that contrast with the downward trend in elderly employment over this period. When just males are used, this effect is absent.
Incentive Regressions
In this section, we explore the use of an index capturing the incentive for elderly workers to retire. By using this index, we hope to use variation in the work behavior of the elderly that is related to policy changes rather than potentially endogenous economic shocks that might affect all parts of the economy. The index, described in more detail in the appendix, attempts to encapsulate in one number for each year in the data set the overall incentives faced on average by elderly labor market participants. This may be a somewhat difficult task to undertake because the time series variation in benefi ts is not large-as discussed earlier, the reforms of the system have been few, especially compared with many European countries. A graph of the index values against elderly employment rates appears in fi gure 12.4. The Ibar line represents the full index, capturing both the wealth and dynamic incentive effects. The Wbar line shows the average value of Social Security Wealth among those still in the labor force. (Again, more details are in the appendix.) There are no sharp jumps in Wbar through time, so the growth in Wbar refl ects wage growth across cohorts and through time. The sharp increase in Ibar after 1971 refl ects the infl uence of the well-known "notch" in Social Security benefi ts. The impact of the notch lives on into the 1980s in this calculation because we average over the incentives faced by active labor market participants, and the "notch generation" was still active into the mid-1980s.
How should the index results be interpreted? When the index increases, it should decrease the labor force participation of the elderly. This means that we expect to see negative coefficients for the employment of the elderly when regressed on this measure. Following through, if there is less employment among the elderly, a positive coefficient among the youth or prime-aged would indicate that there is evidence of crowding out. Table 12 .3 begins the analysis, using the same eight specifi cations as in the direct analysis in tables 12.1 and 12.2. The top panel shows results without additional controls, and the bottom panel shows similar results from specifi cations with control variables. The fi rst two columns contain the results for the impact of the index on the elderly. The results, mostly, are statistically insignifi cant. The fi ve-year log difference specifi cation does show statistical signifi cance in the expected direction, with higher unemployment and lower employment indicated in years with higher values for the retirement incentive index.
A scatter plot of the fi fth difference of the Ibar index and the elderly employment rate appears in fi gure 12.5. In this scatter plot, there is no clear relationship between the two variables. This may explain the lack of consistent fi ndings in the fi rst two columns of table 12.3.
For youth and prime-aged individuals, the results in table 12.3 are mixed. The youth columns show two statistically signifi cant negative results for unemployment and two positive results for employment. If there were crowd out, this is the direction we would expect these coefficients to go. For the prime-aged, there is one positive coefficient for unemployment and several positive coefficients for employment. The stronger results for prime-aged employment are consistent with the idea of crowd out-higher retirement incentives for the elderly appear to be related to more employment by the prime-aged. For these results, the caveat discussed earlier about the long-run upward trend of female employment again becomes important. For this reason, we again investigate the results just for men in table 12.4. In the fi rst two columns for the elderly, the results are mildly stronger than the pooled men and women results, with several statistically signifi cant fi ndings. The positive relationship between the incentive index and unemployment-and the negative relationship of the index with employment-indicates that the incentive index is somewhat predictive of the labor market behavior of the elderly.
The results for the youth and the prime-aged, however, show no consistent pattern. There are a few statistically signifi cant results across the table, but the signs are not clearly in one direction or the other. For example, the second row with the three-year lag on elderly employment shows a signifi cant -0.015 drop for a one unit increase in the index. However, when controls are introduced in the sixth row of the table, the coefficient is now negative and signifi cant at the 10 percent level. The overall impression of this table, however, is of no statistically signifi cant relationship between the incentive index and the employment of young and prime-aged men. 
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated the impact of elderly employment on the youth and prime-aged labor markets. In the "direct" regressions, we fi nd some evidence that movements in elderly employment are negatively related to prime-aged employment. However, our males-only evidence suggests that these fi ndings may be tainted by the inclusion of women, who experienced a large secular increase in employment over this period. Using the incentive index, we fi nd little evidence of crowd out. But our incentive index is not strongly predictive of the labor market behavior of the elderly, so this may refl ect more on the difficulty of exploiting the available policy variation in a time series study.
Our conclusion, therefore, is relatively weak. We fi nd no consistent evidence of an impact of the employment of the elderly on the young or prime-aged in our sample. This evidence for one country alone may not be conclusive. However, when placed in the context of the other countries in this project, it is possible that stronger conclusions may be drawn-again highlighting the potential power of the multicountry analysis. where W(a, y) is the SSW at age a and year y, PV * (a, y) is the peak value of SSW, and ␣ and ␥ are the weighting parameters for the wealth level and peak value difference, respectively. These I(a, y) terms are then summed across all previous ages, within cohort: where LFP(a -t, y -t -1) is the labor force participation rate for a member of the cohort in a previous year. The extra minus 1 accounts for the fact that we want the labor force participation rate at the beginning of the year, not during the year. Finally, we average across all cohorts in a particular year, where P(a, y) is the population of the cohort in a given year. This I ෆ(y) term is the incentives index used for the regressions appearing in tables 12.3 and 12.4. We also make use of W ෆ(y), which is calculated by substituting the SSW of the individual at age a and year y, W(a, y), in for I (a, y) . This W ෆ(y) term calculates the average pension wealth across individuals in a given year.
